Puente says Urda trains remained visible to control center

Spain's transport minister details the instruction to resume normal running after a safety-system failure, while leaving responsibility to investigators.

Channel: RTVE Noticias ·

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Puente apunta a un error humano en el accidente de tren de Urda | RTVE Noticias

Things we can learn from the video

Press to jump

2:24Puente places the rear-end collision near Urda station on the Madrid-Seville high-speed line.
4:37He says a computer failure disabled LZB protection, stopping trains as a precaution.
6:00He describes authorization for normal running despite a stationary train ahead and a red signal.
10:05Any movement should have been restricted to running within sight, at no more than 40 kilometers per hour.
20:00Puente says another driver corrected a control-center instruction to ensure restricted running.
22:34He says both trains remained located on monitoring screens throughout the incident.

The two trains involved in the Urda collision remained visible on the control center's monitoring screens throughout the incident, Spain's transport minister Óscar Puente says. His account places the instruction to restart a stopped train at the center of the investigation.

Speaking at rail infrastructure manager Adif's control center in Madrid's Atocha station, Puente sets out a sequence of events in footage carried by Spain's public broadcaster RTVE Noticias (Radio Televisión Española). Later reporting by the broadcaster puts the death toll at 68, above the preliminary figure he gives during this press conference.

According to Puente, a computer failure knocked out the LZB train-protection system at 08:30, bringing trains to a preventive stop. Six minutes later, the control center instructed a Renfe train to resume normal running, despite a stationary Iryo train ahead and a red signal. The rear-end collision occurred at 08:53 near Urda station, on the Madrid-Seville high-speed line in Toledo province.

Renfe is Spain's state-owned train operator; Iryo is a private high-speed operator. Adif manages the tracks and signaling, rather than operating the passenger services.

Puente says any authorization to proceed should instead have required restricted running under "marcha a la vista": moving cautiously within the distance the driver can see, at no more than 40 kilometers per hour. He also describes another driver correcting an instruction from the control center so that their train would operate under that restriction.

Although the video's title points toward human error, Puente declines to assign that label directly when reporters ask. He says judicial and technical investigations must establish responsibility. He also says it is not yet clear why the Iryo train had remained stationary despite receiving earlier permission to move.

The minister defends the railway's overall safety and says LZB is being progressively replaced by the European ERTMS system. Returning to what controllers could see, he says he reviewed the complete sequence from the protection system's failure to the impact: both trains' positions were known throughout.